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Available but irrelevant: when and why information
from memory hinders diagnostic reasoning
Anique B H de Bruin,1,2 Gino Camp2 & Jeroen J G van Merriënboer1
Doctors are not computers, fortu-
nately. They don’t calculate risks
weighting patient information
equally, stating diagnoses with a
non-negotiable and carefully com-
puted level of probability. Instead,
doctors are humans. They possess
limited working memory capacity to
process the information they
receive from patients,1 they have to
work with rapidly changing
circumstances, and they are
required to make decisions under
suboptimal conditions. In any
presentation of patient informa-
tion, each symptom may open up a
multitude of possible diagnoses,
and computing the correct diag-
nosis is a task the human mind
cannot approach by considering
each possibility. Through evolution
our brains have adapted to solve
such complex tasks and we have
learned to develop and implement
heuristics, also known as ‘rules of
thumb’ or cognitive shortcuts, to
guide our decision making. Evi-
dence that these cognitive short-
cuts benefit diagnostic reasoning is
underlined by the observation that
computers, apart from a handful
of exceptions, have great difficulty
in matching the diagnostic perfor-
mance of doctors and that intelli-
gent software usually mimics the
heuristic reasoning strategies used
by doctors.2 It is important to note,
as do Wegwarth et al.,3 that these
heuristics are not just the result of
the constraints of human working
memory, but are also used
because the information available
is always limited, which renders
future outcomes uncertain and
the solution to the problem
incomputable.
Evidence that cognitive shortcuts benefit
diagnostic reasoning is underlined by the
observation that intelligent software
usually mimics the heuristic reasoning
strategies used by doctors
So how should doctors approach
diagnostic reasoning given that the
resources available to them, both
externally and internally, may be
severely limited? Marewski et al.4
advocate what they term ‘ecological
rationality’. Given the sparse
resources that we humans are faced
with, we need to rely on cognitive
shortcuts. That is to say, our ratio-
nality is bounded.5,6 However, the
heuristics we apply are not
universal, all-or-none phenomena.
Individuals develop these so as to fit
the structure of the environment,
which make them highly specialised
for specific tasks in specific
circumstances. In a similar vein,
experienced doctors possess highly
evolved heuristics within their area
of specialty that allow them to
reason flexibly and to the best of
their ability. Recent studies have
even emphasised the finding that
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doctors perform better when they
process less information.7
Heuristics are also used because the
information available is limited, future
outcomes are uncertain and the solution
to the problem incomputable
As the article in this issue by
Mazzocco and Cherubini8 clearly
points out, the story unfortunately
does not end here. The authors
show in a carefully controlled
experimental set-up a potential
drawback of the use of heuristics.
Their results reveal that 39% of
experienced doctors and 56% of
experienced nurses changed their
diagnosis on a novel but similar case
when confronted with an aversive
outcome on a previously diagnosed
case. This phenomenon is the result
of a wrongfully applied heuristic and
leads to what is termed ‘outcome
bias’.9 Obviously, it is undesirable
that, based on a single case experi-
ence, doctors and nurses ignore
their entire knowledge base and
change their clinical diagnosis.
To shed light on these findings, it is
useful to elaborate on a specific
characteristic of human memory.
To compensate for limited capacity,
human memory facilitates the
remembering of recently encoun-
tered or salient information under
the assumption that what
happened a short time ago, or what
left a large impression on the
rememberer, is relevant to retrieve.
The latter situation is considered
adaptive in medical decision mak-
ing: a salient error will lead a doctor
to more careful screening for cer-
tain diagnoses in the future. By
contrast, the former situation is
generally considered maladaptive
in clinical reasoning and leads to
availability bias, or the situation in
which information that was stored
recently is easily retrieved from
memory and thereby exerts an
exaggerated influence on decision
making.10 One can imagine that in
other situations this memory
mechanism is very useful (e.g. when
searching for your car keys). How-
ever, in medical decision making,
availability bias should be avoided
as the better diagnosis is always the
one that is based on the doctor’s
entire knowledge base rather than
the one that is overshadowed by the
most recent experience. Outcome
bias could be considered a special
case of availability bias in that a
recent, salient, although irrelevant,
experience (negative outcome)
dominates memory and thus diag-
nostic reasoning for a certain
amount of time. Awareness of how
and when it occurs and its aversive
effects should be fostered among
doctors and medical students.
Human memory facilitates the
remembering of recently encountered
information under the assumption that
what happened a short time ago is
relevant to retrieve
The well-controlled experiment
run by Mazzocco and Cherubini8
allows for a number of relevant
experimental extensions that will
provide insight into the scope of
this type of availability bias as they
sketch it. Firstly, it is interesting to
assess the duration of bias in a
naturalistic setting. Does the effect
hold for a number of hours, days or
weeks? Or does it hold until the
next patient with a similar pattern
of symptoms presents, regardless of
elapsed time? An answer to this
question is crucial to determine the
extensiveness of availability bias in
everyday clinical reasoning.
Moreover, varying the similarity
between cases both superficially
and structurally is useful to exam-
ine how sensitive doctors’ reason-
ing is to this bias. That is, what
degree of overlap between patient
symptoms is minimally required for
availability bias to occur? Finally,
these questions can be supple-
mented with the effect of expertise
in the same experiment. Does the
bias diminish as experience grows?
Does the effect of similarity
between cases depend on experi-
ence?
In medical decision making, the better
diagnosis is always based on the doctor’s
entire knowledge base rather than being
overshadowed by recent experience
How do doctors recover from pos-
sible aversive effects of heuristics?
Recent research by Mamede et al.11
shows that doctors do so as
adaptively as they use these heuris-
tics. These researchers asked
residents in internal medicine to
study a number of simple and
complex clinical cases under one of
three instructions. Participants
stated a diagnosis either immedi-
ately after studying the case or after
working on an unrelated distracter
task (solving word puzzles) for
several minutes, or were asked to
evaluate their diagnosis in light of
the evidence and decide upon a
final diagnosis afterwards. For
complex cases, the latter instruc-
tion of what they termed ‘conscious
thought’ led to the best diagnostic
decisions. For simple cases, even
the immediate decisions led to
good diagnoses and consciously
thinking about them did not
improve them. This leads us to
conclude that the use of heuristics
is justified in routine diagnostic
reasoning and, when faced with a
complex case, a relatively simple
instruction of consciously thinking
about the evidence for a diagnosis
before coming to a final conclusion
can prevent heuristic errors. In
itself, the flexible use of either
heuristic or conscious reasoning
depending on case complexity
could be called a case-approach
heuristic that experienced doctors
should be aware of and that
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students should learn to apply in
clinical practice.
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Stress and learning
Charles B Kromann, Morten L Jensen & Charlotte Ringsted
Most of us have discovered that
otherwise readily available memo-
ries can be impossible to retrieve in
stressful situations. Somehow, the
harder you work at remembering
something, the more annoyingly
impossible it is to do so. Later, in a
more relaxed setting, the volatile
piece of information suddenly
pops up without the slightest
effort. This situation corresponds
with the general impression that
stress is detrimental to memory
retrieval, an impression that is
supported by neurobiological trials
of the effects of arousal and stress
hormones.1,2 Furthermore, a
chronic high stress level is known
to have an impact on both physical
and mental health.3 However,
there is also a common belief that
a little bit of stress can boost a
learning process. In the military, in
aviation and, certainly, also in
medical simulation, stress has
intuitively been added to learning
situations in order to increase
learning outcome.1
In this issue of Medical Education,
the paper ‘Adding emotional stres-
sors to an ACLS course enhances
participant performance in a simu-
lated cardiopulmonary arrest’
argues that we should deliberately
use stressors as part of teaching in
order to promote long-term learn-
ing outcome.4 By contrast, the
paper ‘The Medical Student Stress
Profile: a tool for stress audit in
medical training’ proposes that we
should consider individualised
stress regulation in medical stu-
dents in order to promote effective
learning and health.5 It is pertinent
for medical educators at all levels to
consider the learning environment
for their medical students and
junior doctors at all times.
In the military and in aviation, stress has
intuitively been added to learning
situations in order to increase learning
outcome
DeMaria et al.4 demonstrate that
emotional stress applied in con-
trolled simulations in a context
relevant to and congruent with the
subject of the simulation has the
effect of enhancing resuscitation
skills learning. Two groups of
medical students went through
similar courses. The only element
that differed was how the actors
behaved during the simulation
scenarios. In the intervention
group, the actors’ behaviour was
problematic and emotional: the
nurses argued; the interns and
relatives panicked. In the control
group, the actors were subservient
or helpful. During the simulation-
based training, the intervention
group was measurably more
stressed than the control group. An
assessment of long-term learning
outcome 6 months after the course
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